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Recently AEA President Joseph Pechman observed that politicians, 
not expert economists, direct national economic policy. 1 He further 
commented that "as the public prestige of economists has slipped, 
politicians have felt much freer to interject their own pet economic 
theories in place of those offered by economic experts." Thus, it 
should come as no surprise to experts in antitrust policy to discover 
that similar "pet theories" direct national economic policy towards 
large corporate enterprise, mergers, and economic concentration. 
The three papers in this session are to a great extent attempts 
by economic experts to challenge "pet theories" in current antitrust 
policy. Professors Walter Adams and James W. Brock challenge the 
"pet theory" that corporate bigness is efficient and promotes national 
economic welfare. Professor William L. Baldwin challenges the pet 
theory that current merger policy is an optimum. Finally, Professor 
Ronald W. Cotterill questions the pet theory that mergers among large 
supermarket food chains provide substantial consumer benefits. 
These are excellent papers by expert economists. They follow 
all of the basic methodological requirements for modern economic 
science. Theirs are sincere and honest professional efforts. I share 
the Adams-Brock concern over corporate giantism. I agree with 
Baldwin that Reagan's antitrust policy does not appear to generate 
long-term welfare gains for the United States. And, I agree with 
Cotterill that consumers are likely to be adversely affected by the 
continuation of merger activity among the largest supermarket food 
chains. 
Obviously, I would have no reluctance in assi~ing these papers 
to a class in industrial organization. The papers present most of the 
latest data on corporate size, antitrust policy, and an important policy 
issue in the food marketing industry. Moreover, the editor of the 
Review of Industrial Organization should be looking forward to their 
inclusion in a forthcoming edition. 
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Now, after delivering the tradional encomia, I want to highlight 
a few issues. Adams and Brock remark that they found it "supremely 
ironic--and depressing--that American propagandists for bigness should 
justify their cause by pointing to events abroad." What should really 
depress them is not this message but the true nature of the messenger. 
Large corporate enterprises routinely engage in the marketing of 
national economic policy. And why not? Hasn't a Nobel economist 
advised that "citizens who ultimately control their own social order..  
search for those rules of the political game that will best suit their 
purposes, whatever these might be. "2 And, haven't they also been 
told that "the electoral process for the selection of legislators. . .  
creates a market for legislation in which legislators 'sell' legislative 
protection to those who can help their electoral prospects. "3 
I believe that the relationship between large corporate size and 
political marketing in a democracy needs new economic modeling. 
One of the questions I would like to see tackled by industrial 
organization economists is whether or not a large flow of corporate 
political funding can generate a new political industry that then 
fashions its own policy agenda for the United States. 
Baldwin interprets current DOJ merger guidelines as revealing 
a "relaxation" of antitrust enforcement standards. Professors Greenhut 
and Benson point out that "under the new guidelines, the [Brown 
Shoe] case would not even be instituted. "4 Admittedly, Brown Shoe 
might have been "a prosecutor's dream. "5 However, the current DOJ 
guidelines seem to have erased Section 7 violations from the antitrust 
handbook. The current HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) criteria 
permit a dominant firm with a 30 percent market share to acquire 
sequentially every small firm in the competitive fringe. Even when the 
dominant firm reaches 40 percent, it can continue to gobble up 
sequentially middle-size firms having 7 to 10 percent shares. Isn't this 
a repudiation of Section 7? 
Professor Cotterill contends that "horizontal mergers in foot 
retailing will tend to substantially lessen competition." Using his Table 
II, I noted that every one of the listed mergers violated the merger 
criteria of Brown Shoe. Table II also provides estimates of consumer 
losses from anticipated price increases. His focus on the interests of 
the consumer is a significant factor in assessing the competitive 
consequences of mergers in the food industry. It would please 
Thurman Arnold but offend a former Secretary of Agriculture who 
chastized American consumers for enjoying low food prices. 
Personally, I support vigorous enforcement of U.S. antitrust 
laws. As to Pechman's objection to "pet theories," I find instances of 
what Lasswell called "editing the public map of reality "6 in the media 
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presentation of antitrust policy. Thus, pet theories can become so- 
called scientific hypotheses. Finally, I have a suggestion for future 
work. I have been developing EFTEP-I/E balance models for 
national economies in the global system. I fmd that the formal 
inclusion of industrial organization theories is essential for realistic 
model-building. I urge you to "enter" the field and offer competitive 
policy modeling to macroeconomics. 
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